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Same-sex marriage opponents frequently suggest that if
same-sex unions are constitutionally protected, then polygamous
unions must also be protected, as if no more must be said to
establish that neither should be recognized. 1 Yet, this reductio ad
absurdum fails for two distinct reasons. First, even were it
constitutionally permissible for states to ban polygamous
relationships, that hardly would establish that same-sex unions
could also be prohibited, since the kinds of reasons that tend to be
accepted as justifications for polygamy bans have little or no force
in the same-sex marriage context. 2 Second, the case establishing
the permissibility of polygamy bans is not nearly as obvious or
strong as its opponents imply. Indeed, a strong case can be made
for the proposition that polygamy is constitutionally protected. 3
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the oft-made claim that
if same-sex marriages are constitutionally protected, then plural
marriages must also be protected. This Part suggests that
although that argument is false because the two are
distinguishable in constitutionally significant ways, a good
argument can be made for the proposition that both same-sex
marriage and plural marriage are constitutionally protected. Part
II discusses free exercise jurisprudence generally, focusing on how
the current jurisprudence can be squared with the Court's
discussions and holdings on polygamy. Part III analyzes the
t. Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. Jeffery J. Ventrella, Square Circles?!! Restoring Rationality to the Same-Sex
"Marriage" Debate, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 681, 694 (2005) ('The true analogue
to same-sex 'marriage' is not interracial marriage, but rather polygamy .. "); Amy
L. Wax, The Conservative's Dilemma: Traditional Institutions, Social Change, and
Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059, 1081 (2005) ('Traditionalists warn
that sanctioning same-sex marriage will inevitably lead to the legalization of other
suspect forms of conduct, including polygamy, group marriage, incest, and
bestiality."); Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 4,
2003, at 26 ("Among the likeliest effects of gay marriage is to take us down a
slippery slope to legalized polygamy and 'polyamory' (group marriage).").
2. See discussion infra Part I.
3. See discussion infra Part II.
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harms associated with plural marriage, suggesting that current
plural marriage bans are not narrowly tailored enough to
withstand the close scrutiny that should be given to statutes that
either target religious practices or that implicate hybrid rights.
This Part also discusses the free exercise implications for Native
American marriages and same-sex marriages. The Article
concludes that the Free Exercise Clause requires an exception be
recognized for some same-sex marriages and for some plural
marriages involving consenting adults.
I. On Same-Sex Marriage and Plural Marriage
Some commentators suggest that recognition of same-sex
marriages will force states to also recognize polygamous unions. 4
Regrettably, these commentators fail to explain why such a result
might be expected. Indeed, when the claim is examined more
closely, its implausibility becomes apparent. The two types of
marriages are distinguishable in several ways that have
constitutional import.5 For example, same-sex marriage bans
classify on the basis of sex because men are permitted to marry
women but not men, and women are permitted to marry men but
not women.6 Plural marriage bans do not suffer from a similar
infirmity, although it may well be that neither type of relationship
can be prohibited without offending constitutional guarantees.
Historically, courts and commentators suggested that if
exceptions were made to the then-current marriage laws, a variety
of hitherto prohibited marriages would also have to be recognized. v
For example, when rejecting the argument that an interracial
4. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for
Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 47 ("If same-sex marriage must be
legalized to accommodate the subjective, identity-defining sexual-intimacy
preferences of gays and lesbians, it would be very difficult to refuse to recognize
consanguineous marriage, polygamy, and other prohibited marriages on a
principled basis.").
5. Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and the
United States: Controversy over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social Institution,
20 BYU J. PUB. L. 195, 197 n.7 (2006) ("[R]ecognition of same-sex marriage raises
very different issues from recognition of polygamy, from both constitutional and
social policy perspectives.").
6. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) (noting that the
state's same-sex marriage ban regulates "access to the status of married persons,
on the basis of the applicants' sex"); Elizabeth Larcano, A "Pink" Herring: The
Prospect of Polygamy Following the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2006) ("Where a ban on same-sex marriage violates equal
protection, polygamy does not. In banning same-sex marriage, states use 'sex' as
the forbidden variable. This serves to unjustifiably and unconstitutionally
discriminate against same-sex couples.").
7. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 4.
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marriage validly celebrated in another domicile had to be
recognized locally, the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Bell
8
reasoned:
[Otherwise,] we might have in Tennessee the father living
with his daughter, the son with the mother, the brother with
the sister, in lawful wedlock, because they had formed such
relations in a State or country, where they were not prohibited
.... Yet none of these are more revolting, more to be avoided,
or more unnatural than the case before us. 9
By the same token, in Scott v. State, 10 in which the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld that state's antimiscegenation law, Justice
McCay implied in his concurring opinion that the state's power to
prohibit interracial marriage was on the same footing as the
state's power to prohibit incestuous relationships.11 Needless to
say, when the United States Supreme Court clarified in Loving v.
Virginia'2 that interracial marriage bans were unconstitutional,
the parade of horribles anticipated by these jurists did not
materialize in Tennessee or Georgia, even though Loving made
those states' interracial marriage bans unenforceable. 13
History repeats itself in the context of the same-sex marriage
debate, where it has been suggested that the recognition of such
marriages will lead to the state's recognition of a variety of
relationships that are currently prohibited. 14  So too, the
8. 66 Tenn. 9 (1872).
9. Id. at 11.
10. 39 Ga. 322 (1869).
11. McCay wrote:
Marriage is a civil contract, regulated by law, and I see no reason why the
prohibition against persons of different color entering into that contract is
regulating the social status of the citizen, any more than the law
regulating the age of the parties, or the laws fixing the degrees of their
relationship, or the law providing that there shall be but one such contract
in existence at a time, are laws regulating the social status. They all stand
upon the same footing.
Id. at 327 (McCay, J., concurring).
12. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
13. Tennessee and Georgia were among the sixteen states outlawing interracial
marriage at the time Loving was decided. See id. at 6 n.5.
14. See George Dent, Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J.
PUB. L. 419, 440 (2004) ("If two unrelated men can marry, why can't two brothers
marry? There certainly is no concern about birth defects. And if two women can
marry, is it degrading to women to let three women marry?"); cf. Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 648 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The Court's disposition today suggests
that these provisions are unconstitutional, and that polygamy must be permitted in
these States on a state-legislated, or perhaps even local-option, basis-unless, of
course, polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than
homosexuals."); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
("[T]here is arguably a stronger foundation for challenging statutes prohibiting
polygamy than statutes limiting marriage to members of the opposite sex 'because,
unlike gay marriage, [polygamy] has been and still is condoned by many religions
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analogous parade of horribles has not materialized in
Massachusetts, notwithstanding that state's recognition of same-
sex marriage. 15
One claim frequently made is that the recognition of same-
sex marriage will lead to the recognition of polygamous
marriages. 16 Yet, recognition of the former hardly entails
recognition of the latter, given that the former marriages are
composed of exactly two people while the latter are composed of at
least three. Indeed, some commentators suggest that the
polygamy argument is so implausible that its being offered is a
sign of desperation. 17
Other commentators take this slippery slope claim more
seriously. For example, Professor Volokh offers one reason that an
individual might link the recognition of same-sex unions to the
recognition of polygamous unions:
[W]hen polygamists seek recognition of their marriages, one
intuitive response is that polygamy just isn't "marriage"
within the American constitutional right to marriage and the
American legal tradition of marriage: Marriage is what it has
traditionally been, namely the union of one man and one
woman, and polygamous unions simply don't qualify. And this
definitional argument could be supported by a Burkean
empirical claim-we shouldn't lightly change centuries-old
institutions, because such changes are likely to be harmful. 18
and societies."' (quoting George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage,
15 J.L. & POL. 581, 628 (1999))), aff'd as modified, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006);
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 996 (Wash. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring
in judgment only) ('The last prohibition, like the bigamy/polygamy prohibition, is
definitional. A 'marriage' means a marriage between one man and one woman (and
the only marriage of each spouse)."); Sen. Santorum Compared Same-Sex Marriage
to 'Man on Child, Man on Dog' Sex, U.S. FED. NEWS, 2006 WLNR 19372569, Nov. 7,
2006 ('The National Gay & Lesbian Task Force issued the following news release:
Rick Santorum, the third-ranking GOP senator, compared same-sex marriage to
,man on child, man on dog' sex.").
15. Cf. David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 53, 82 (1997) (discussing the implausibility of "the prospect conjured by
Senator Jesse Helms that permitting gay marriage would lead to the collapse of
American society").
16. See Ventrella, supra note 1, at 694; Wax, supra note 1, at 1081; Kurtz,
supra note 1, at 26.
17. See, e.g., EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQuALITY,
AND GAY PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO MARRY 71 (2004) ("Slippery-slope diversions are what
opponents of equality try when they don't have a good reason to justify ongoing
discrimination, the equivalent of a lawyer with no arguments and no evidence
pounding the table."). But see Cheshire Calhoun, VWho's Afraid of Polygamous
Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1023, 1037 (2005) ("[D]isestablishing a single form of
marriage would ... open the doors to state recognition of polygamous marriages.").
18. Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1155, 1170 (2005). But see Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil
[Vol. 26:59
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Professor Volokh then writes that "if the public accepts the
notion that tradition isn't a good enough reason to reject same-sex
marriage, it will be harder to argue that tradition is a good enough
reason to reject polygamous marriage." 19 While noting that other
reasons might be offered to justify recognizing one and not the
other,20  he states that "the argument from tradition-an
important and easily understandable argument that might appeal
to the public more than theoretical academic distinctions would-
would be much weakened." 21
Numerous responses might be made to this Burkean
argument. Were an appeal to tradition a persuasive way to justify
the difference, one might simply characterize the relevant
tradition somewhat differently; instead of talking about marriage
as the union of one man and one woman, one might instead
characterize the tradition in terms of the number of people
involved-two rather than three or more. 22  For example, when
describing the vital social institution of marriage, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health23 explained that the "exclusive commitment of two
individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it
brings stability to our society. '24 The court limited its analysis to
relationships involving only two people, implying that the analysis
had no import for relationships involving more than two adults.
It may be that the public would accept an appeal to tradition
as a justification for limiting marriage to two adults, especially if
Professor Volokh is correct that those seeking to marry a same-sex
partner have more political allies than do those seeking to marry
many partners. 25 Yet, appealing to a definition of marriage as a
Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and Constitutional Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 597, 623 (2002) (noting that recent court decisions have not relied on the
traditional definition of marriage when examining polygamy restrictions).
19. Volokh, supra note 18, at 1170.
20. Id. at 1170-71.
21. Id. at 1171.
22. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass.
2003).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 948 (emphasis added); see also Ruth K. Khalsa, Polygamy as a Red
Herring in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 54 DuKE L.J. 1665, 1693 (2005)
("Polygamous relationships can be distinguished from dyadic heterosexual and
same-sex relationships on the basis of underlying values and ideals."); Larcano,
supra note 6, at 1080 (arguing that same-sex marriage is distinguishable from
polygamous marriage because it "remains focused on unity and partnership; that
is, on the exclusive commitment of two individuals").
25. Volokh writes:
Disapproval of polvgamv seems deeply rooted in American culture: it is not
easy to overcome this sort of opposition. The gay rights movement did
2008]
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method of excluding the claims of those seeking access to that
institution is dissatisfying for a number of reasons. One
significant ill is that states would then seem able to restrict
marriage in any desired way by simply defining marriage
restrictively-for example, by saying that interracial unions
simply do not qualify as marriages. 26 Restricting marriage by
merely appealing to definitions or traditions is more likely to be
viewed as a question-begging way of avoiding the issues rather
than as a way of resolving them. 27
There is further difficulty with appealing to tradition as a
way of precluding plural marriages. As Justice Murphy explained
in his dissent in Cleveland v. United States,28 polygyny
was quite common among ancient civilizations and was
referred to many times by the writers of the Old Testament;
even today it is to be found frequently among certain pagan
and non-Christian peoples of the world. We must recognize,
then, that polygyny, like other forms of marriage, is basically a
cultural institution rooted deeDlv in the religious beliefs and
social mores of those societies in which it appears. 29
Insofar as tradition should be our guide, our marriage laws might
have to be much more inclusive than is commonly thought. 30
The focus here is not on whether tradition requires the
recognition of either same-sex or polygamous unions. Nor is it on
overcome such opposition, but it had natural allies that polygamists likely
will not. Gays have many straight friends and family members who are
part of the American mainstream. Polygamy in America today seems to be
chiefly practiced by separatist Mormon communities, whose political
connections are limited by their living apart.
Volokh, supra note 18, at 1176.
26. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions and the Constitution: On the
Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 985-86 (1991).
27. See id. at 989 ("Jurists and theorists who appeal either to definitions or to
legislative intentions to establish the impossibility of same-sex marriages seem not
to appreciate the implications of their position. An appeal to legal definitions is
simply question-begging, while an appeal to nonlegal definitions may support the
opposite position.").
28. 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
29. Id. at 26 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1028
("Polygamy has, in fact, a lengthy history within the Judeo-Christian tradition-
beginning with the polygamous marriages of the Old Testament patriarchs.
Nowhere in either the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament is polygamy forbidden."
(footnote omitted)); Michael G. Myers, Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy:
Homosexual Sodomy... Gay Marriage... Is Polygamy Next?, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
1451, 1474 (2006) ('Polygamy is legal in more than half of all nonindustrialized
societies.").
30. Justice Murphy discussed four fundamental forms of marriage: monogamy,
polygyny, polyandry, and group marriage. Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 25 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of some of the ways in which same-sex unions have
been recognized, see generally JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN
EUROPE (Vintage Books 1994).
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which would be more palatable to public tastes. Rather, the focus
is on whether one or both might plausibly be afforded some
constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause.3 1
II. Polygamy and the Constitution
Any discussion of the constitutionality of plural marriage
bans must consider current free exercise jurisprudence on the one
hand and some of the Supreme Court cases dealing with polygamy
on the other. Free exercise jurisprudence has evolved greatly over
the past 130 years, 32 so it is not at all clear that something that
passed muster under those guarantees in the 19th century would
also pass muster in the 21st century. That said, the seminal case
involving the regulation of polygamy is Reynolds v. United
States.33
A. Reynolds v. United States
Any analysis of the constitutionality of polygamy bans must
take Reynolds into account. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to a law criminalizing
polygamy, 34 even while noting that "Congress cannot pass a law
for the government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free
exercise of religion. '35 Thus, the Court was confident that the
polygamy ban at issue did not offend then-current free exercise
guarantees. 36
It is not immediately obvious why the Reynolds Court
believed the polygamy ban survived examination under the Free
Exercise Clause, although an examination of some of the Court's
reasoning may shed light on what the Justices were thinking. The
Court explained that "[p]olygamy has always been odious among
the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the
establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a
feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people." 37 Yet, the
31. The Free Exercise Clause reads "Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. See discussion infra Parts II.A & II.B.
33. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
34. See id. at 166 ("In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration
is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as
prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places
over which the United States have exclusive control.").
35. Id. at 162.
36. Id. at 166.
37. Id. at 164; see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946)
(quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
2008]
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Court's noting where and by whom polygamy has been practiced
seems to be a non sequitur-it is not as if the Constitution
includes a provision specifying that practices accepted in northern
and western Europe cannot be regulated but that practices only
accepted in other parts of the world are permissibly proscribed.
Indeed, some commentators suggest that by discussing where
polygamy was practiced, the Reynolds Court was not merely
offering a non sequitur, but in addition was engaging in
xenophobia. 38
A charitable interpretation of the Court's comments
regarding the views of northern and western Europeans is that the
Court was attempting to establish that it was not the intent of the
Framers to protect polygamy. Thus, the Court wrote that "there
never has been a time in any State of the Union when polygamy
has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the civil
courts and punishable with more or less severity,"39 concluding
that it was "impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty
of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect
to this most important feature of social life." 40 According to this
interpretation of Reynolds, the Court was considering European
practices as well as practices in the United States at the time of
the Constitution's adoption to determine whether it could
plausibly be argued that the Framers (and, perhaps, the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment) intended to include polygamy
within the practices protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 41
The Reynolds decision, concerning the "most important
feature of social life," 42 is easier to understand in light of the
Court's apparent belief that the state had to choose between
polygamy and monogamy-the Court noted that "it is within the
legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to
determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of
social life under its dominion."43 Yet, at least one of the questions
38. Calvin Massey, The Political Marketplace of Religion, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1,
29 n.164 (2005); see also Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1041 ("Justice Waite's reason
for rejecting polygamy in Reynolds was driven in part by hostility to non-European
cultures.").
39. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
40. Id.
41. Cf. Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed
Amar's The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 498 (1999) (suggesting that it
may be more important to "focus[] on Reconstruction, not the Founding, if we want
to understand the intended meaning of incorporated liberties[, including those
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause]").
42. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
43. Id. at 166.
[Vol. 26:59
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at hand is whether both might be recognized within the same
system, 44 especially considering that even if polygamy were
permitted, it seems extremely unlikely that a high percentage of
marriages would involve polygamous unions. 45 If there would be
relatively few polygamous relationships even were they
permitted, 46 then it is not at all clear that the recognition of plural
marriages would somehow harm society. Even if, as some claim,
monogamy is built into the moral fabric of society, 47 that fabric
would not be torn asunder merely because a minority of
individuals practiced plural marriage.48
Just as current jurists and commentators sometimes suggest
that the recognition of same-sex marriage would lead to the
44. Cf. Keith F. Sealing, Polygamists out of the Closet: Statutory and State
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free
Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 754-55 (2001) (noting that England has
survived despite allowing polygamy within its borders).
45. See Chambers, supra note 15, at 82; James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the
Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage Is Not a Commitment to Polygamous
Marriage, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 544 (2002) ("First, even within polygamy-tolerant
societies, the percentage of men taking more than one wife is actually quite low.");
Keith Jaasma, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Responding to Smith;
Reconsidering Reynolds, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 211, 294 (1995); cf. Elizabeth
Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression
of Mormon Polygamy As a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1331 (1998).
46. While it is doubtful that many would practice polygamy, it should not be
thought that the discussion here is of mere theoretical interest. See James Askew,
The Slippery Slope: The Vitality of Reynolds v. U.S. after Romer and Lawrence, 12
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 627, 631 (2006) ("Yet, Mormon fundamentalists continue
to practice polygamy. Some sources estimate that the figure may be as high as
30,000 people."); Chambers, supra note 15, at 61 ("Most Americans do not know
that polygamy, and particularly polygyny, the practice of men marrying more than
one woman, remains widespread in the world as a whole. Well more than half of
nonindustrialized societies permit polygyny still today."); Harmer-Dionne, supra
note 45, at 1298 ("The question of polygamy is not merely a historical one. Both
African Christians and Moslems may currently engage in the practice."); Jaasma,
supra note 45, at 246-47 ("It has been estimated that there are some 50,000
practicing Mormon polygamists in the United States .... "); Charles J. Reid, Jr.,
And the State Makes Three: Should the State Retain a Role in Recognizing
Marriage?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1277, 1297-98 (2006) ("Polygamy was also-and
remains-a regular feature of life in sub-Saharan Africa. Yoruban women of
Western Nigeria continue to practice polyandry."); Sealing, supra note 44, at 693-
94 (discussing "the estimated 25,000 to 50,000 Mormon practitioners of polygamy,
as well as the nearly 1,000 Christian polygamists, and Islamic and African
practitioners of polygamy" (footnote omitted)); Maura Strassberg, The Crime of
Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 354 (2003) ("Today, there are ten
times as many Mormon fundamentalists living in polygynous marriages as there
were in the original Mormon community in 1862.").
47. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985)
(Monogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock
upon which our culture is built.").
48. See Sealing, supra note 44, at 754-55.
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recognition of polygamous marriage, 49 the Reynolds Court worried
that permitting an exception to a neutral polygamy ban for
Mormons would require the Court to make a variety of exceptions
for those wishing to exercise their religious beliefs. 50 The Court
implied that there would be no justifiable stopping point if it
recognized an exception here, and the Court would be compelled to
recognize human sacrifice as protected as well.5 1 But this result
would be absurd.52
Yet, it is not at all clear why the Court could not examine
each case on its merits and judge whether the implicated state
interests were sufficiently compelling to justify refusing to make
an exception. 53 The harms implicated in permitting consenting
adults to enter into plural marriages can hardly be thought
equivalent to the deliberate ending of innocent human life. By the
same token, if the worry about polygamy is that young girls are
forced into relationships against their wills, it is not clear how
permitting adults but not children to enter into such relationships
would result in an increase in the number of forced marriages
involving minors. 54
Reynolds was issued in 1878 and might be thought to have
little relevance now, almost 130 years later. 55 Yet, that decision
has been cited with approval in numerous decisions, 56 and some of
49. See Wardle, supra note 4, at 47.
50. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
51. Id. at 166.
52. Cf. id. at 166-67.
53. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Harmer-Dionne, supra note 45,
at 1302 (suggesting that the Reynolds Court ignored "any ability of the courts to
make analytical distinctions"); Jaasma, supra note 45, at 254 ("inhere is no reason
that granting one exception for religiously motivated conduct, such as polygamy,
necessarily requires government to make an exception for other religiously inspired
conduct, such as suicide or human sacrifice.").
54. See Strassberg, supra note 46, at 368 ("Even if concerns about coercion and
forced marriages justify criminalization of polygyny when teenage brides are
involved, these concerns may not be able to be generalized to polygynous marriages
by adults.").
55. See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742 (Utah 2006) (noting the plaintiffs
"assertion that Reynolds is antiquated beyond usefulness"); State v. Green, 99 P.3d
820, 825-26 (Utah 2004) (noting that Reynolds "may be antiquated in its wording
and analysis").
56. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 535 (1993); Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith 485 U.S. 660, 671
(1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 702 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
257-58 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 249 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
MARRIAGE AND FREE EXERCISE
the reasoning in Reynolds has been repeated in subsequent
decisions. 57 For example, over half a century after Reynolds, the
Cleveland Court also worried that permitting a religious belief
defense would create a loophole to protect a variety of practices. 58
That Reynolds has been cited with approval in recent
decisions is an important but not dispositive factor in any analysis
of its continuing vitality. Needless to say, the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence has changed greatly since Reynolds.59 For example,
it seems unlikely that the Reynolds Court would have struck down
a law prohibiting religious animal sacrifice, since the Court might
then have wondered whether it would thereby be committed to
permitting human sacrifice as well. 60 Yet, in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court recently
declared unconstitutional a law targeting religious animal
sacrifice. 61  While Hialeah does not overrule Reynolds, it
nonetheless suggests that the relevant jurisprudence is evolving
and should be reexamined.
B. The Religious Accommodation Cases
In a series of cases, the Court has examined the conditions
under which the state must make an exception to its laws to
accommodate religious practices. Most of these cases involved the
denial of unemployment benefits,62 but some involved other
issues. 63
In Sherbert v. Verner,64 the Court examined whether an
individual could rightly be disqualified from receiving
420, 462 (1961); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
57. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1140 (C.D. Utah 1984)
("There appears to the court to be no reasonable alternatives to the prohibition of
the practice of polygamy to meet the compelling state interest found in the
maintenance of the system of monogamy upon which its social order is now
based.").
58. Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 20 ("It is also urged that the requisite criminal intent
was lacking since petitioners were motivated by a religious belief. That defense
claims too much. If upheld, it would place beyond the law any act done under claim
of religious sanction.").
59. See Green, 99 P.3d at 825 ("We are cognizant of the fact that Reynolds['s]
... reasoning may not necessarily comport with today's understanding of the
language and apparent purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.").
60. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Suppose one
believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it
be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not
interfere to prevent a sacrifice?").
61. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 547.
62. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
63. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
64. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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unemployment benefits when her reason for being unavailable for
Saturday work involved her religious beliefs. 65 The Court noted
that Adell Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was forced to choose
between following her religious beliefs and foregoing benefits on
the one hand, and foresaking her beliefs and working on Saturday
on the other,66 and likened the burden imposed on her to a tax.
The Court reasoned that "[g]overnmental imposition of such a
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her
Saturday worship,"' 67 and held that the state's refusal to recognize
an exception for Sherbert violated free exercise guarantees. 68
When striking down South Carolina's refusal to make an
exception for Seventh Day Adventists, the Court rejected the
state's contention that building such an exception into the law
would violate Establishment Clause guarantees. 69 The Court
reasoned instead that extending unemployment benefits to those
observing Saturday as a day of worship was nothing more than the
government's acting neutrally in light of different religious
practices. 70 The Court also rejected the state's contention that it
could deny Sherbert unemployment benefits because they involved
a mere privilege rather than a right,71 noting, "[i]t is too late in the
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege." 72
The Sherbert Court was not suggesting, however, that all
religious practices, no matter how dangerous, must be exempted
from the law. On the contrary, regulations posing "some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order"73 have been
upheld, even if contravening particular religious beliefs. 74
Unemployment benefits were also at issue in Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division.75
Eddie Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness who had been working in a
65. See id. at 400-01.
66. Id. at 404.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 410.
69. Id. at 409.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 404 ("Nor may the South Carolina court's construction of the statute
be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment
compensation benefits are not appellant's 'right' but merely a 'privilege."').
72. Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
73. Id. at 403.
74. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
75. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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foundry, was transferred to a department that produced turrets for
tanks. 76  Because his religious beliefs precluded him from
participating in the production of war materials and because there
were no positions available where he could perform work which
would not involve the production of weapons, he quit. 77 He then
applied for unemployment compensation benefits, which were
denied. 78
Unlike Thomas, some Jehovah's Witnesses believed that the
production of weapons is not religiously prohibited; 79 however,
Thomas rejected that interpretation of his religious duty.80 The
Court noted that there were different views about whether
Thomas's religion precluded him from producing munitions, but
stated that "it is not within the judicial function and judicial
competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."' The Court
explained that the relevant question was whether the individual's
beliefs were sincerely held, noting that "religious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment protection."
8 2
Indiana was burdening the free exercise of religion by
attaching significant costs to Thomas's acting in light of his
beliefs, just as South Carolina had burdened the free exercise of
Sherbert's religious beliefs. The Thomas Court explained:
76. Id. at 709.
77. Id. at 709-10.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 711 ("[Thomas] said that when he realized that his work on the
tank turret line involved producing weapons for war, he consulted another Blaw-
Knox employee-a friend and fellow Jehovah's Witness. The friend advised him
that working on weapons parts at Blaw-Know [sic] was not 'unscriptural."').
80. See id. ('Thomas was not able to 'rest with' this view, however. He
concluded that his friend's view was based upon a less strict reading of Witnesses'
principles than his own.").
81. Id. at 716; see also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S.
829, 834 (1989) (rejecting "the notion that to claim the protection of the Free
Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization" and stating that because plaintiffs "refusal was based on a sincerely
held religious belief. . . . [H]e was entitled to invoke First Amendment protection"
(footnote omitted)).
82. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714; cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88
(1944) (affirming that the district court had "ruled properly when it withheld from
the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or
doctrines of respondents"). The Ballard Court explained that the Framers
"fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration
of conflicting views. Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the state.
He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the
verity of his religious views." Id. at 87.
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Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief,
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial. 83
Thus, free exercise guarantees may be implicated where benefits,
rather than rights, are at issue. Even indirect pressure to forego
religious practice is enough to trigger constitutional protections of
religion. 84
As was also true in Sherbert,85 Thomas makes clear that
sincere belief does not immunize a practice or prevent the
government from burdening its expression if the exercise of that
belief endangers society. 86
The mere fact that the petitioner's religious practice is
burdened by a governmental program does not mean that an
exemption accommodating his practice must be granted. The
state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing
that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest. 87
Thus, the fact that the state is precluding an individual from
freely exercising his religion does not establish that the state is
acting impermissibly. That said, the state must establish that the
interest implicated is compelling and the means employed are
narrowly tailored to promote that interest.
In Thomas, the plaintiffs job description rather than his
religious beliefs had changed during the course of his
employment.8 8  At issue in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission8 9 was whether unemployment benefits could be
denied to someone who could no longer perform her job because of
a change in her religious beliefs subsequent to her initial
employment. 90 The Court refused to treat a person who converted
during the employment differently, 91 reasoning that the timing of
her conversion was not relevant to the analysis of whether her free
exercise rights had been infringed. 92 Because she was forced to
83. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
84. Id.
85. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
86. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 710.
89. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
90. Id. at 137 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 144.
92. Id.
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choose between her employment and her religious beliefs, the
state's denial of unemployment benefits because she chose the
latter violated free exercise guarantees. 93 Here, as in Sherbert,
the Court rejected the argument that making an exception for
Hobbie would violate the Establishment Clause, 94 since "the
government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious
practices ... without violating the Establishment Clause."95 Thus,
in all of these cases, the Court rejected the arguments that a right
had to be at issue before free exercise guarantees would be
implicated and that Establishment Clause guarantees would
prevent the state from accommodating the religious practices of
these individuals.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,96  the Court examined the
constitutionality of Wisconsin's requirement that children attend
school through age sixteen.97 At issue was whether Wisconsin had
to include an exception for children whose parents refused to send
them to school for religious reasons. For example, the Amish
sincerely believed 98 that, "by sending their children to high school,
they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the
censure of the church community, but ... also endanger their own
salvation and that of their children."99 The issue before the Court
was not whether the Wisconsin requirement was constitutional as
a general matter, 10 0 but only whether an exception had to be made
to accommodate free exercise concerns. 101
The Yoder Court reasoned that Wisconsin's requirement
could withstand a free exercise challenge either by showing that
the requirement did not really impinge on free exercise or by
showing that "there [was] a state interest of sufficient magnitude"
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 144-45 (footnote omitted); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
713 (2005) ("This Court has long recognized that the government may . . .
accommodate religious practices . . .without violating the Establishment Clause."
(quoting Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144-45)).
96. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
97. Id. at 206.
98. See id. at 209 ("The State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were
sincere.").
99. Id.
100. See id. at 213 ("There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education.").
101. See id. at 214 ("[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly
we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." (citation omitted)).
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to justify the limitation of religious liberty. 10 2 The State was
unable to establish either of those conditions. 03
In Yoder, there was abundant support for the claim that a
religious, rather than secular, way of life was at issue-"the
traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by
an organized group, and intimately related to daily living."'10 4
Further, it had been established beyond dispute that Amish
children receiving a high school education were seriously affected
by that education.
The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by
exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of
attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by
substantially interfering with the religious development of the
Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the
Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent state of
development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and
Dractice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the
child. 105
Of course, establishing that a high school education had a
serious effect on these children did not end the relevant inquiry.
The regulation might still have been upheld if the State could
show that its interest was of "sufficient magnitude," which would
have justified placing this burden on religious exercise.
The Yoder Court admitted that individuals' activities, even
when based on religious beliefs, may nonetheless be subject to
regulation by the state.10 6 However, the Court also noted that
some kinds of conduct are protected by free exercise guarantees,
"even under regulations of general applicability." 10 7 The Court
explained that even a neutral law may violate constitutional
requirements "if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."10 8
Whether a regulation unduly burdens free exercise depends on the
magnitude of the State's interest and on the extent to which it is
necessary to burden the religious exercise to promote that interest.
Wisconsin claimed that its interest in the education of its
youth was so compelling that interference with religious belief was
justified. 10 9 However, the Yoder Court was unwilling to accept the
102. Id.
103. Id. at 219.
104. Id. at 216.
105. Id. at 218.
106. Id. at 220.
107. Id. (citation omitted).
108. Id. (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 221.
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importance of the State's interest in enforcing this law against the
Amish, "despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases," 1 0
precisely because "fundamental claims of religious freedom are at
stake." '11 1  Rather, the Court felt compelled to "searchingly
examine the interests that the state seeks to promote by its
requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the
impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing
the claimed Amish exemption." 112 Thus, the Court accepted that
the State might, as a general matter, have compelling interests at
stake in requiring school attendance until age sixteen. However,
the Court was unconvinced that permitting an exception for the
Amish would undermine those compelling interests.
The Court suggested that upholding the regulation would
have imposed more than a slight burden. At issue was a "severe
interference with religious freedom." 113 Noting that "[a] way of life
that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests
of others is not to be condemned because it is different,"11 4 the
Yoder Court held that the regulation as applied violated
constitutional guarantees. 115
The Free Exercise Clause does not always require the state to
accommodate religious beliefs. For example, United States v.
Lee 116 involved an Amish farmer who refused to pay social security
for his employees. 117 "[T]he Amish believe it sinful not to provide
for their own elderly and needy and therefore are religiously
opposed to the national social security system."'1 8 Indeed, the
Amish were religiously barred both from accepting social security
benefits and from contributing to that system. 119 The sincerity of
these beliefs was not contested, 120 and the Court accepted that
required participation in the social security system burdened Lee's
free exercise rights. 121
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 227.
114. Id. at 224.
115. Id. at 234.
116. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
117. Id. at 254.
118. Id. at 255 (footnote omitted) (referencing the district court's analysis).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 257 ("[T]he Government does not challenge the sincerity of this
belief.").
121. Id. ("Because the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits violates Amish
religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social security system interferes
with their free exercise rights.").
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The Court's finding that there was a conflict between the law
and the sincerely held religious beliefs was "only the beginning,
however, and not the end of the inquiry."122 The Court noted that
some burdens on religion are permissible, 123 and that state
limitations on religious liberty are acceptable if "essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest."'124 The Court
reasoned that required participation in the social security system
was a fiscal necessity 125 and that a national system based on
voluntary participation would be very difficult, if not impossible, to
administer.126 The Court then concluded that the Government
had a very important interest in assuring mandatory participation
in the social security system. 127
However, Lee was not suggesting that participation in the
social security system should be made voluntary for all. Rather,
he was suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause demanded
exemptions for those with religious beliefs requiring non-
participation.
The Lee Court's reasoning anticipates the effect on the
judicial system of exempting Amish citizens from participation in
the social security system. 128 The Court noted that it could not
readily distinguish between social security taxes and general tax
revenues. 129 It then considered the myriad of tax challenges to
general expenditures that it would receive, such as challenges by
those who believed their tax dollars should not be used to support
a war effort which contravened their religious principles. 13 The
Court explained that the "tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge [it] because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 257-58.
125. Id. at 258.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 258-59.
128. See id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ('"The Court rejects
the particular claim of this appellee, not because it presents any special problems,
but rather because of the risk that a myriad of other claims would be too difficult to
process.").
129. Id. at 260 ('There is no principled way, however, for purposes of this case, to
distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security
Act.").
130. Id. at 260 ("If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if
a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-
related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt
from paying that percentage of the income tax.").
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belief."1 3 1  It then concluded that, because there is such an
important interest in maintaining a sound tax system, sincere
religious beliefs would not justify the failure to pay one's taxes. 132
The Court understood that rejecting Lee's challenge would burden
his free exercise rights, but offered the consolation that
maintenance of a religiously pluralistic society requires some
religious practices to be sacrificed for the common good. 133
While there have been several cases over the years involving
free exercise guarantees, 134 one of the most important cases in the
development of this jurisprudence was Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.13 5 In Smith, the Court
addressed whether Oregon could include the religious use of
peyote within its general prohibition on use of that drug and
whether the state could deny unemployment benefits to
individuals who were fired from their jobs for the sacramental use
of peyote. 136 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not
preclude Oregon from criminalizing the religiously inspired use of
peyote, 13 7 noting that the Reynolds Court had "rejected the claim
that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally
applied to those whose religion commanded the practice." 138
The Smith Court explained that "[t]he only decisions in
which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of
a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections." 13 9 This analysis, sometimes called the Hybrid Rights
analysis, 140 suggests that neutral, generally applicable laws will
be upheld against free exercise challenges unless the plaintiffs can
establish that the statutes also implicate another constitutionally
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 259.
134. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a Washington
constitutional provision precluding funding for vocational religious instruction);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (striking down a Tennessee statute barring
clergypersons from being delegates to the state's limited constitutional convention
as a violation of free exercise guarantees).
135. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136. Id. at 874.
137. Id. at 890.
138. Id. at 879.
139. Id. at 881.
140. See, e.g., Kyle Still, Smith's Hybrid Rights Doctrine and the Pierce Right:
An Unintelligent Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385 (2006) (discussing Smith's hybrid





Smith's characterization of the pre-existing jurisprudence is
inaccurate.141 Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie all involved
successful challenges to existing laws where the plaintiff did not
assert that the statute at issue implicated a constitutionally
protected interest in addition to her free exercise rights. Indeed,
both the Sherbert and Thomas Courts denied that the success of a
free exercise challenge depended on whether a right in addition to
free exercise was at issue. 142 While the Smith Court offered its
own analysis of the unemployment compensation cases, the point
remains that the hybrid analysis simply did not account for the
then-existing jurisprudence. 143 Indeed, perhaps appreciating that
its account was inaccurate, the Court offered a kind of fallback
hybrid theory, suggesting that generally applicable criminal laws
will only implicate First Amendment free exercise guarantees if
both free exercise and an additional constitutionally protected
interest are at issue.144
Another difficulty involved in the Smith analysis is that its
suggestion that only hybrid challenges to generally applicable laws
have been successful is ambiguous. Such a claim might be taken
to mean that, while strict scrutiny has been employed when state
regulations burdened free exercise rights, it turns out that only
the hybrid challenges have been successful. 145 For example, Lee
involved an unsuccessful challenge to the government's
requirement of participation in the social security system. In that
case, the Court believed the state's interest sufficiently important
and the means sufficiently closely tailored to pass muster
141. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 571 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[W]hatever Smith's virtues, they do not include a comfortable fit with settled
law.").
142. See supra notes 71-72, 83 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of
the states' claims that they could deny unemployment compensation because mere
benefits rather than rights were at issue).
143. See Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) ('The
Supreme Court's most recent free exercise decision, Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), effected a significant
change in first amendment law.").
144. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ("Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert
some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to
require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.").
145. Cf. id. at 896-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ('That we
rejected the free exercise claims in those cases hardly calls into question the
applicability of First Amendment doctrine in the first place. Indeed, it is surely
unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss
record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us.").
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notwithstanding the Court's employment of strict scrutiny.146
Conversely, the success of free exercise challenges when
implicating hybrid rights might suggest that only hybrid free
exercise challenges to generally applicable laws will trigger strict
scrutiny. The Smith Court interpreted the jurisprudence as
adopting this approach. 147 Such a reading contradicts Lee, not
with respect to the result, but with respect to the level of scrutiny
avowedly employed by the Court.
The Smith Court denied that strict scrutiny had to be
employed when examining Oregon's statute, fearing the burden
that would thereby be imposed on the state whenever it passed
legislation impacting religious exercise. 148 The Court questioned
whether any state could afford to have such a burden imposed as a
matter of law, and reasoned that such a system would be
especially dangerous in a state with a multiplicity of religious
views. 149
Smith suggests that the United States Constitution does not
require strict scrutiny to be employed whenever a state statute
burdens religious practices. Of course, a separate issue is
implicated if such a standard is adopted by statute pursuant to a
recognized power. 150
At issue in City of Boerne v. Flores'51 was an attempt by
Congress to restore protection to religious freedom, which it
146. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
147. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech
Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 664-65 (2006) ("Smith noted that in 'hybrid
situation[s],' where 'the Free Exercise Clause [is raised] in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech,' extra Free Exercise Clause
scrutiny might still be required even when the government action is religion-
neutral.").
148. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 ("If the 'compelling interest' test is to be applied at
all, then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously
commanded." (footnote omitted)).
149.
[The] danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them.
Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of
almost every conceivable religious preference," Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. [599, 606 (1961)], and precisely because we value and protect that
religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively
invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct
that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
Id.
150. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005) ("The [Smith] Court
recognized, however, that the political branches could shield religious exercise
through legislative accommodation, for example, by making an exception to
proscriptive drug laws for sacramental peyote use." (citation omitted)).
151. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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believed had been removed by Smith. 152 Basically, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") required that strict scrutiny be
employed when courts reviewed statutes burdening the free
exercise of religion.153 The Court understood Congress's action to
be an attempt to correct the Smith decision, thereby making
Congress, rather than the Court, the ultimate arbiter of what the
Constitution means.1 5 4  The Court held that Congress had
exceeded its power insofar as the RFRA was to govern state
laws. 155
Yet, the Boerne Court did not thereby invalidate the RFRA
for all purposes. At issue in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal1 56 was whether the RFRA barred the
federal government from precluding a religious sect from using a
hallucinogenic tea for sacramental purposes.1 57 The government
argued that it "ha[d] a compelling interest in the uniform
application of the Controlled Substances Act, such that an
exception" could not be made even for the sacramental use of the
hallucinogen. 158 However, the Court rejected the argument that
the uniformity rationale sufficed as a justification. 159  The
Gonzales Court explained that a substantial burden on free
exercise could not be justified merely by asserting a general
interest in uniformity. 160  Rather, an analysis would have to be
offered explaining why the requested accommodation could not be
granted. 16 1 The Court explained that the refusal to grant an
exemption might be justified if doing so would make it very
152. Id. at 512 ("Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)."); see also id. at 529 (stating that the RFRA
"invalidate[s] any law which imposes a substantial burden on a religious practice
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of
accomplishing that interest").
153. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3) (1993).
154. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 ("When the Court has interpreted the
Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
embraces the duty to say what the law is." (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177)); id. at 519 ("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is.").
155. Id. at 536 ("[Ihe provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority . .
156. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
157. See id. at 423.
158. Id.
159. Id. ("We conclude that the Government has not carried the burden
expressly placed on it by Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and
affirm the grant of the preliminary injunction.").
160. Id. at 435.
161. Id.
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difficult to administer the program at issue; 162 however, the Court
denied that free exercise protections could be overridden simply by
making a general slippery-slope argument. 163  Instead, the
Gonzales Court reaffirmed "the feasibility of case-by-case
consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable
rules."164 Basically, Gonzales offers a reading of what protections
would be offered under free exercise jurisprudence where strict
scrutiny has been triggered. 165
The Smith Court's suggestion that strict scrutiny of a
generally applicable law would only be triggered when a hybrid
claim was presented is quite controversial. Other members of the
Court were not persuaded that this analysis represented existing
doctrine, 166 was necessary to prevent the state from being
subjected to impossible constraints, 167 or even captured the
Framers' intent.16 8 As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence,
"[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general
applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral
toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious
162. Id.
163. Id. at 435-36.
164. Id. at 436 (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)).
165. See id. at 439 (2006).
But Congress has determined that courts should strike sensible balances,
pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the Government to
address the particular practice at issue. Applying that test, we conclude
that the courts below did not err in determining that the Government
failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling
interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca.
Id.
166. For example, Justice Blackmun wrote:
This Court over the years painstakinglv has developed a consistent and
exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that
burdens the free exercise of religion. Such a statute may stand onlv if the
law in general, and the State's refusal to allow a religious exemption in
particular, are iustified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by
less restrictive means.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1990); see also
id. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Court today gives no
convincing reason to depart from settled First Amendment jurisprudence.").
167. See id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Under our
established First Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom
to act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute.").
168. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 550 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Although the Framers may not have asked precisely the questions about religious
liberty that we do today, the historical record indicates that they believed that the
Constitution affirmatively protects religious free exercise and that it limits the
government's ability to intrude on religious practice."); cf. id. at 565 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (writing that there are "serious doubts about the precedential value of
the Smith rule," especially in light of historical understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause).
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conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively
as laws aimed at religion."'169
One of the implications of Smith is that the practices of
religious minorities might well be subjected to burdens imposed
through the political process. 170  This would seem to be the
antithesis of a clause designed to protect religious freedom, since
the religious practices of the majority would seem to be at much
less risk of being curtailed through the political process in the first
place. As Justice O'Connor noted:
[Tihe First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the
rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by the
majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our
free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact
maioritarian rule has had on unDonular or emereina religious
groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish. 171
Smith did not address the appropriate level of scrutiny applied to
neutral or generally applicable laws.
At issue in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah172  were three ordinances which precluded animal
sacrifice.173 The Court recognized that these ordinances were
169. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
170. Id. at 890; Elliot M. Mincberg, A Progressive Organization's Look at RFRA,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 801, 803 (1999) ("Smith has in fact harmed religious liberty,
particularly with respect to minority religions and those most vulnerable."); see also
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 263, 295 (1992) (arguing that, after Smith, it became very easy for
governments to withstand Free Exercise challenges made by oppressed religious
minorities).
171. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
172. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
173. The ordinances were described as follows:
In September 1987, the city council adopted three substantive ordinances
addressing the issue of religious animal sacrifice. Ordinance 87-52 defined
"sacrifice" as "to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal
in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of
food consumption," and prohibited owning or possessing an animal
"intending to use such animal for food purposes." It restricted application
of this prohibition, however, to any individual or group that "kills,
slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of
whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed." The
ordinance contained an exemption for slaughtering by "licensed
establishment[s]" of animals "specifically raised for food purposes."
Declaring, moreover, that the city council "has determined that the
sacrificing of animals within the city limits is contrary to the public health,
safety, welfare and morals of the community," the city council adopted
Ordinance 87-71. That ordinance defined sacrifice as had Ordinance 87-
52, and then provided that "[iut shall be unlawful for any person, persons,
corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate
limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida." The final Ordinance, 87-72, defined
"slaughter" as "the killing of animals for food" and prohibited slaughter
outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. The ordinance provided an
exemption, however, for the slaughter or processing for sale of "small
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passed in order to suppress the practices of a particular religion 174
and examined the ordinances with strict scrutiny. 175
The Hialeah Court made clear that, as a general matter,
statutes targeting religious belief or practice will not pass
muster. 176 While reaffirming that a neutral law of general
applicability need not trigger strict scrutiny merely because some
religious practices have been burdened, 177 the Court also made
clear that the facial neutrality of an ordinance would not
immunize it from close scrutiny. 178 The Free Exercise Clause
"protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well
as overt."'179
The Hialeah analysis may well have important implications
for statutes adopted to criminalize polygamy. It seems clear that
Mormons in particular were targeted when Congress precluded
polygamy in the territories. 8 0 While not per se unconstitutional,
such targeting will rarely survive strict scrutiny. 181
Consider the Court's discussion of polygamy in Late Corp. of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption
provided by state law." All ordinances and resolutions passed the city
council by unanimous vote. Violations of each of the four ordinances were
punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 60
days, or both.
Id. at 527-28 (quoting HIALEAH, FLA., ORDINANCES §§ 87-52, -71, -72).
174. Id. at 534 ('The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression
of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the
ordinances.").
175. Id. at 533-34 ("[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, see [Smith, 494 U.S. at
878-79]; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.").
176. Id. at 523 ("The principle that government may not enact laws that
suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are
recorded in our opinions.").
177. Id. at 531; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005) ("[T]he
Court held, in [Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82], that the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general
application that incidentally burden religious conduct.").
178. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534 (1993) ("Facial neutrality is not determinative.... Official action that targets
religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance
with the requirement of facial neutrality.").
179. Id.
180. Cf. Jaasma, supra note 45, at 255 ("Under the type of scrutiny that the
Court applied in Lukumi, it is questionable whether the statute examined in
Reynolds would be found to be neutral or generally applicable, further undermining
the precedential value of Reynolds.").
181. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546.
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States.182 Understanding that polygamy laws targeted Mormons,
the Late Corp. Court implied that this was a reason to uphold,
rather than strike down, the laws. The Court suggested that the
"organization of a community for the spread and practice of
polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to
the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity
has produced in the Western world." 18 3 Lest there be any doubt
who was the subject of the law, the Court wrote:
It is unnecessary here to refer to the past history of the sect, to
their defiance of the government authorities, to their attempt
to establish an independent community, to their efforts to
drive from the territory all who were not connected with them
in communion and sympathy. The tale is one of patience on
the part of the American government and people, and of
contempt of authority and resistance to law on the part of the
Mormons. 184
One factor that makes the Late Corp. Court's implicit
position on the constitutionality of laws targeting Mormon
polygamy more complicated is that the Court rejected the idea that
a religious practice was at issue. Characterizing the claim that
polygamy fell within the protections afforded to religious practices
as a "pretence," 18 5 the Court described such an argument as
"altogether a sophistical plea."'18 6 The Court noted: "No doubt the
Thugs of India imagined that their belief in the right of
assassination was a religious belief; but their thinking so did not
make it so,"lS7 thereby suggesting that polygamy, like
assassination, was falsely thought to involve a religious practice.
So, too, the Court said that the "practice of suttee by the Hindu
widows may have sprung from a supposed religious conviction,"18 8
as if to emphasize that this would not accurately be thought a
religious practice.
The Late Corp. Court stated that "the state has a perfect
right to prohibit polygamy, and all other open offenses against the
enlightened sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the pretense
of religious conviction by which they may be advocated and
practiced."'189 Yet, it is simply unclear how much of a role is
played by the Court's rejection of these practices as religious and
182. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).





188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
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how, if at all, the Court's analysis would have been different had
polygamy been viewed as a veridical religious practice.
Unlike the Late Corp. Court, the Reynolds Court dealt with
polygamy as a religious practice. The Court stated that, while
laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices." 190  The Court further defined the
relevant question as "whether those who make polygamy a part of
their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute."191
While both Courts discussed suttee, the Reynolds Court discussed
"a wife [who] religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself
upon the funeral pile of her dead husband,"192 without qualifying
the belief as "a supposed religious conviction," as did the Late
Corp. Court. 193
While differing about whether polygamy was a religious
practice, the Reynolds and Late Corp. Courts reached the same
conclusion regarding the constitutionality of the imposition of
burdens on polygamy. It might be thought, then, that the Late
Corp. Court would have reached the same result even had the
members of that Court considered the issue before it194 as
involving a veridical free exercise claim. Yet, such a conclusion
may not be warranted. The composition of the Court differed
between the decisions,1 95 and the decisions were written by
different Justices. 196 It could be, for example, that members of the
Late Corp. Court would have taken a "legitimate" free exercise
190. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
191. Id.
192. Id. But see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1943)
(suggesting that Reynolds did not view polygamy as a religious rite subject to First
Amendment protection).
193. Late Corp., 136 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added).
194. At issue before the Court was a congressional act that targeted polygamy by
invalidating the incorporation of the Church of the Latter Day Saints and by
causing its property to escheat to the state. Id. at 6-8.
195. There was a great deal of turnover during the twelve years between the two
decisions. Justices Miller, Field, Bradley, and Harlan were on both Courts. 98 U.S.
v (1878); 136 U.S. iii (1889). Chief Justice Waite of the Reynolds Court was
replaced by Chief Justice Fuller of the Late Corp. Court. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
& GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. B-3 (15th ed. 2004). Associate
Justice Clifford of the Reynolds Court was replaced by Associate Justice Gray of the
Late Corp. Court. Id. Associate Justice Strong of the Reynolds Court was replaced
by Associate Justice Lamar of the Late Corp. Court. Id. Associate Justice Hunt of
the Reynolds Court was replaced by Associate Justice Blatchford of the Late Corp.
Court. Id. Associate Justice Swayne of the Reynolds Court was replaced by
Associate Justice Brewer of the Late Corp. Court. Id.
196. The Reynolds opinion was written by Chief Justice Waite, Reynolds, 98 U.S.
at 153, while the Late Corp. opinion was written by Justice Bradley. Late Corp.,
136 U.S. at 3.
20081
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claim quite seriously. 197
In any event, the Court taking a serious approach is not
equivalent to the Court upholding the challenge. Indeed, the
Reynolds Court implied that the Free Exercise Clause did not
provide particularly robust protections, worrying that were an
exception made for those with particular religious beliefs, "then
those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief
may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be
acquitted and go free."'198 Yet, this alleged anomaly is part of the
current free exercise jurisprudence-an individual who is
unavailable for work for religious reasons may be eligible for
unemployment compensation whereas an individual who is
unavailable for work for some other reason may not be so entitled.
An individual who keeps her fifteen-year-old out of high school for
religious reasons may be immunized from criminal prosecution,
whereas an individual who keeps her fifteen-year-old out of high
school for another reason might be subject to prosecution.
There are a number of reasons, then, why Reynolds should
not be thought dispositive in a case involving a challenge to a
state's polygamy ban. The current jurisprudence allows an
197. A mere two years after Late Corp., the Court decided Holy Trinity Church
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), in which the Court made clear that "this is a
religious nation." Id. at 470. At issue in Holy Trinity was how to construe a federal
statute which read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America. in Congress assembled. That from and after the passage
of this act it shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or
corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in
any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or
aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its Territories,
or the District of Columbia. under contract or agreement, parol or special.
express or implied, made previous to the importation or migration of such
alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any
kind in the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia.
Id. at 458. The question before the Court was whether the statute should be
construed to apply to the importation of clergy. Id. The Court suggested that such
was not the intent of Congress. Id. at 459. The Court further suggested that it
would have reached the same conclusion even had the clergyperson involved been
Catholic, Baptist, Episcopal, or Jewish. See id. at 472. However, the Court did
quote with approval a New York case in which Chancellor Kent upheld a
blasphemy conviction and also said:
Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the Constitution as some have
strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish
indiscriminately, the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet [sic] or of
the Grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes that we
are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted
upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of those
impostors.
Id. at 471 (quoting People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294-95 (N.Y. 1811)).
198. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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exception for religious practice, which would not be offered for non-
religious practice, notwithstanding Reynolds's view to the
contrary. Even if the Smith free exercise jurisprudence accurately
reflects the current jurisprudence, a statute targeting religious
practice1 99 would still have to be examined with strict scrutiny
following Hialeah.20 0 Further, the hybrid rights rule recognized in
Smith would also seem applicable in this kind of case. 20 1 At issue
is the right to marry, which is a fundamental interest. 20 2
Presumably, that interest is sufficiently important to trigger the
hybrid rule. 203  If the interest in educating one's child as
implicated in Yoder triggers hybrid analysis, 20 4 then the right to
marry must do so as well. 205 Thus, even under Smith, many
polygamy bans would be appropriately subjected to strict scrutiny.
III. On Harms and Tailoring
Recently, individuals have challenged polygamy bans as
violations of free exercise guarantees. 20 6  While none of these
challenges has been successful, the courts examining the
implicated issues have disagreed in a number of respects,
including which state interests are served by such bans and what
level of scrutiny should be employed when reviewing the
constitutionality of these statutes. These differences are very
important because the proper identification of the interests at
issue and the degree to which the existing regulation promotes
199. Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1024 ("Bars to polygamous marriages were
targeted at the Mormon practice of plural marriage in the Utah territory, and were
first erected under the Morrill Act of 1862 that made bigamy a federal offense."
(footnote omitted)); see also Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir.
1985) ("Because of the claim that Utah's proscription against plural marriages was
mandated by Congress in Utah's Enabling Act as a condition for admission into the
Union, the trial court on motion of the State of Utah ordered the United States to
be joined as a party." (footnote omitted)).
200. Jaasma, supra note 45, at 255; Sealing, supra note 44, at 737.
201. See Jaasma, supra note 45, at 254-55 (suggesting that polygamy may fall
into the hybrid category recognized in Smith).
202. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) ("[T]he right to marry is of
fundamental importance.").
203. See Sealing, supra note 44, at 737 ("First, under Smith, because marriage is
a fundamentally important right protected by the Due Process Clause, it meets
Justice Scalia's 'hybrid situation' test.").
204. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82
(1990).
205. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 ("[T]he decision to marry has been placed on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child
rearing, and family relationships.").
206. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 741 (Utah 2006); State v. Green, 99
P.3d 820, 826 (Utah 2004).
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those interests will be central if strict scrutiny is employed. 20 7
Indeed, precisely because marriage plays such an important role
in a variety of religious traditions, limitations on marriage should
be required to be narrowly tailored to promote compelling state
interests.
A. The Harms of Polygamy
Courts and commentators have discussed a number of harms
associated with the practice of polygamy, ranging from the
imposition of patriarchy to the abuse and neglect of women and
children. 20 8 However, those justifying polygamy bans on these
bases fail to consider the implications of the position asserted.
Often, the legitimate state interests asserted would be served even
with an exception for some polygamous unions. Further, were
these rationales really sufficient justifications for restricting
marriage, a whole host of marriages currently permitted would be
at risk of prohibition. While there may be plausible justifications
for current polygamy laws, they have not yet been offered.
The Utah Supreme Court has described some of the harms
associated with polygamy. The court has explained that polygamy
"often coincides with crimes targeting women and children[,
including] incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay
207. The Tenth Circuit upheld Utah's polygamy ban under strict scrutiny,
believing that permitting polygamy would undermine monogamy. See Potter v.
Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he State is justified, by a
compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to
protect the monogamous marriage relationship."). However, it is unclear why
permitting some to enter into polygamous marriages would erode this foundation.
The Potter district court warned about all who would try to enter into polygamous
relationships if they could. See Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1140
(C.D. Utah 1984).
There appear to the court to be no reasonable alternatives to the
prohibition of the practice of polygamy to meet the compelling state
interest found in the maintenance of the system of monogamy upon which
its social order is now based. Any broad exception to that prohibition in
cases of polygamy sincerely practiced as a "religious" belief would engulf
the prohibition itself with ever extending and complicating exceptions
based largely on subjective claims, irremediably eroding the police power
of the state and its compelling interest.
Id. But it is not at all clear that there would be such a groundswell to engage in
this practice, even were it permitted. See supra text accompanying note 45
(suggesting that not many would enter into polygamous unions even were the
option available).
208. See, e.g., State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004); Samantha Slark, Are
Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests of
Consenting Adults? 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 455 (2004) ("Statutory rape, incest,
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, child abuse, cohabitant abuse and criminal
non-support of children have been identified as crimes associated with the practice
of polygamy.").
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child support."20 9 State v. Green210 and State v. Holm2 11 illustrate
some of the harms implicated in or resulting from polygamous
relationships. Green was convicted of criminal nonsupport and
bigamy. 212  An avowed polygamist, he had simultaneous
relationships with numerous women and fathered twenty-five
children. 213 In Holm, the defendant was convicted of bigamy and
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. 21 4 Holm legally married
Suzie Stubbs 215 and then took part in additional religious
marriage ceremonies, including one with Ruth Stubbs, Suzie's
sixteen-year-old sister.21 6  While aware that her union with
Rodney was not a civil ceremony recognized by the law, Ruth
testified at trial that she considered herself married to Holm. 217
Sometimes, polygamous relationships are contracted without
everyone having full knowledge of the other participants 218 and
without following legal requirements like formally divorcing one
spouse before attempting to marry another. 21 9 When that occurs,
there appears to be a clear violation of laws precluding an
individual from having more than one spouse at a time. Green
and Holm were not so obviously in violation of the bigamy statute
as would someone who contracted multiple, simultaneous
marriages.
Consider Green, who participated in several marriage
ceremonies with different women. 220 Each time, he was careful to
divorce his current wife before marrying the next. 221 That said, he
did participate in unlicensed ceremonies while already legally
209. State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004); see also Slark, supra note 208,
at 455.
210. 99 P.3d 820.
211. 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).
212. Green, 99 P.3d at 822.
213. Id.
214. Holm, 137 P.3d at 730.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 731.
218. See, e.g., State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (discussing wife
who apparently did not know that her husband had also married other women
without divorcing any of them).
219. See id. ("Geer told [Sergeant] Mann that he had been married thirteen
times and was not certain if he was married at the time he married Colleen
Edwards in September 1987. Geer also told Mann he was not involved in any
divorce proceedings.").
220. State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 822 (Utah 2004).
221. Id. ("Green avoided being in more than one licensed marriage at a time by




married.222 Further, he continued his relationships with his
divorced wives as if they and he were still married. 223 Thus, he
seemed to be violating the spirit if not the letter of a ban on plural
marriages. The same might be said of Holm, who had participated
in religious ceremonies not having civil import when establishing
his relationships with his plural wives.224
Yet, both Green and Holm violated both the letter and the
spirit of the Utah bigamy statute225 because that statute extends
both to individuals participating in multiple, simultaneous, civil
marriage ceremonies as well as individuals who cohabit. It reads:
"A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or
wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the
person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another
person." 226 Thus, because Green was married to one woman and
cohabiting with another, he violated the bigamy statute,
notwithstanding the fact that he had never participated in a
licensed marriage ceremony while being married to someone
else. 227 The same analysis would seem applicable to Holm, 228 but
the Holm court found that Holm's behavior fell within the statute's
"purports to marry" prong.229
The Green court addressed whether Utah's bigamy statute
was constitutional in light of federal free exercise guarantees. 230
The court noted that Smith stood for the proposition that "a
neutral law of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest, even if the law has the
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 730-31 (Utah 2006); cf. Alyssa Rower, The
Legality of Polygamy: Using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
38 FAM. L.Q. 711, 717 (2004) ("In order to avoid prosecution, many Fundamentalist
men legally marry only their first wife and 'spiritually marry' their subsequent
wives.").
225. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (2003).
226. Id.
227. See State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 833 (Utah 2004) ("To successfully prosecute
Green under Utah's bigamy statute, the State had the burden of establishing that
Green was legally married and then purported to marry or cohabited with another
woman.").
228. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 735 ("[T]he bigamy statute does not require a party
to enter into a second marriage (however defined) to run afoul of the statute;
cohabitation alone would constitute bigamy pursuant to the statute's terms.").
229. See id. at 737.
230. Green, 99 P.3d at 826 ("Second, even if this court were required to extend its
analysis beyond Reynolds, Utah's bigamy statute would survive a federal free
exercise of religion challenge under the most recent standards enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court.").
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incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." 231
Yet, the court's analysis of whether the law at issue was neutral
was not particularly persuasive.
The Green court noted that "Utah's bigamy statute does not
attempt to target only religiously motivated bigamy. Any
individual who violates the statute, whether for religious or
secular reasons, is subject to prosecution. '23 2  Yet, a neutral
statute can of course target religious practices without doing so
expressly. For example, the statute at issue in Hialeah did not
specifically target religious activity-on the contrary, anyone who
sacrificed animals would be subject to criminal prosecution. 233
As the Hialeah Court explained, the Free Exercise Clause
"protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well
as overt." 234 In other words, the facial neutrality of a statute does
not immunize that statute from further examination. Thus, the
Green court did not fully establish that the statute at issue was
neutral, only noting that the statute also criminalized conduct
performed for non-religious reasons. Further, it would at least
seem relevant that the state had a practice of not prosecuting
individuals who violated the law for non-religious reasons. 235
Even were the statute plausibly read as a neutral law of
general applicability, rather than as a statute targeting religious
practices, a separate question would be whether the law implicates
hybrid rights as the amici argued in briefs before the Green
court.236 However, the court declined to address that argument
because of procedural concerns. 23 7 The court did address whether
Utah's bigamy statute passed the rational basis test, concluding
231. Id. (citing Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
878-80 (1990)).
232. Id. at 828.
233. The Hialeah Court noted that the ordinances at issue "define[d] 'sacrifice' in
secular terms, without referring to religious practices." Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
234. Id. at 534.
235. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 772 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[Tihe state perceives no need to prosecute nonreligiously motivated
cohabitation, whether one of the parties to the cohabitation is married to someone
else or not.").
236. See Green, 99 P.3d at 829 ("Amici argue that Utah's bigamy statute should
nonetheless be strictly scrutinized for a compelling interest because the statute
violates not only Green's free exercise of religion, but also Green's constitutional
rights of privacy and free association, thus presenting a 'hybrid situation."').
237. Id. ("We cannot address amici's arguments because Green neither preserved
nor properly raised or argued any claims alleging violation of constitutional rights




When analyzing whether the statute passed muster under
rational basis review, the Green court noted some of the interests
promoted by the polygamy ban. For example, the court noted that
"prohibiting bigamy implicates the state's interest in preventing
the perpetration of marriage fraud, as well as its interest in
preventing the misuse of government benefits associated with
marital status."239  The court failed to note that had these
marriages been permitted, there would be no implicated issues
involving marriage fraud. Indeed, some commentators suggest
that permitting polygamous marriage would help reduce fraud
because, for example, second wives could not then claim to be
entitled to state benefits for single mothers with children. 240
The Green court might have worried that recognizing a
religious exception for plural marriages would permit nonbelievers
to engage in the practice-they would only need to assert falsely
that this was their religious belief as well. 241 Yet, whenever a
religious exception is granted, there is the possibility that some
will falsely assert that they have the relevant beliefs. It is up to
the state, as prosecutor, and the court, as fact-finder, to ascertain
whether the beliefs asserted are sincerely held. 242 Needless to say,
analogous claims did not win the day with respect to
unemployment compensation, notwithstanding the potential for
abuse. 243
When rejecting the argument that the Free Exercise Clause
required bigamy statutes to contain a religious exception, the
Holm court pointed to the Green court's analysis to support the
proposition that Utah's bigamy statute is a neutral, generally
238.
Having concluded that the State need only show a rational relationship
between its bigamy law and a legitimate government interest, we assess
whether the State has met its burden in this regard. We conclude that
Utah's bigamv statute is rationally related to several legitimate
government ends. First, this state has an interest in regulating marriage.
Id.
239. Id. at 830.
240. Rower, supra note 224, at 728 ("[Ihe legality of polygamy would help
prevent polygamous families from committing welfare fraud. Currently,
polygamous communities receive a substantial amount of assistance from the state
and federal government. By not registering their marriages, multiple wives are
able to collect welfare as single mothers.").
241. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1139 (10th Cir. 1985).
242. Cf. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 766 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("The State does not dispute the sincerity of Holm's
religious motivation .... ).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 64-95 (discussing the unemployment
benefits cases).
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applicable law that passes constitutional muster. 244 Yet, the Holm
court failed to mention that part of Green court's analysis was
based on a procedural point that precluded the court from
considering whether hybrid rights were at issue. 245
To be fair, the Holm court did not rely exclusively on Green
for this part of its analysis. For example, the Holm court implied
that no hybrid right was at issue because there was no right to
enter into polygamous unions protected by the Constitution. 246
Yet, at the very least, this goes too far. 247 First, to the extent that
the Free Exercise Clause only protects rights which are protected
independently by the Constitution, the Clause would be
meaningless. If the right to enter into a polygamous union was
already constitutionally protected, then one would not need to cite
the Free Exercise Clause to establish that this right was
protected; 248 and if the right to enter into such a union is not
already constitutionally protected, then citing the Free Exercise
Clause would not afford it protection anyway. Second, it does not
account for Yoder. While parents have the right to educate their
children, 249 the Wisconsin statute at issue in Yoder was found
constitutional, notwithstanding that fundamental right.250 When
considering the Holm analysis, one may assume the right at issue
in Yoder should not be protected. But that was not what Yoder
held. On the contrary, the Yoder Court required an exception be
made to accommodate the religious beliefs of the Amish-it did not
conclude that no parent could be prosecuted for failing to have her
child attend school until reaching the age of sixteen.251
244. Holm, 137 P.3d at 742.
245. See supra text accompanying note 237.
246. Holm, 137 P.3d at 746 ("[Tlhe right to engage in polygamous behavior is not
encompassed within the ambit of the individual liberty protections contained in our
federal constitution.").
247. Cf. Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1138 (C.D. Utah 1984) ("Nor
is the State's argument sound that there is no fundamental right to the practice of
polygamy as such and therefore only the rationality standard is applicable.").
248. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
249. See generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding that
the states cannot force parents to send their children to attend public school only);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state statute prohibiting
instruction of a foreign language at a certain age, deciding it infringed on parents'
and teachers' rights).
250. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 225 (1972) (affirming the lower
court's requirement that the statute contain a free exercise exception).
251. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 ("[A] State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.").
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The Holm court noted that the people of Utah have "declared
monogamy a beneficial marital form and have also declared
polygamous relationships harmful." 252 Yet, a mere declaration of
what is beneficial or harmful to society cannot be all that is
needed, or else a "way of life that is odd or even erratic" 253 might
simply be declared harmful and, thus, permissibly prohibited.
One of the state interests implicated in Holm was preventing
sexual relations between minors and substantially older adults.
The Holm court expressly noted that Holm had frequently engaged
in sexual activity with Ruth while she was still a minor.254
Certainly, the state has a compelling interest in protecting its
children. But that does not resolve the issue presented in Holm.
According to state law, Holm would not have violated any statutes
by marrying Ruth when she was sixteen (with her father's
consent) 25 5 and then having frequent sexual relations with her, as
long as he had not been married to anyone else at the time. 256
Thus, it is misleading to suggest that the state was attempting to
protect minors from having sexual relations with individuals ten
or more years their senior, 257 given the parental consent
exception.258
The Green court believed one of the most important reasons
to ban polygamy was to prevent crimes against women and
children. 259 Yet, several points can be made about such a
rationale. It is not clear that permitting consenting adults to
participate in plural marriage would result in more plural
marriages involving children, especially if the law clearly stated
that marriages involving children would not be permitted. Indeed,
the state has in effect adopted such a law, since it does not seem to
believe it important to prosecute individuals for entering into
plural marriages unless one of the parties is a child. 260 However,
252. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006).
253. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224.
254. Holm, 137 P.3d at 744.
255. Id. at 751 ("Stubbs's father consented to her religious union with Holm.").
256. Id. (noting that Holm could have legally married Ruth).
257. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.2 (2007) (making it unlawful for an actor to
have sexual relations with someone sixteen or seventeen if the actor is ten or more
years older than the minor).
258. Holm, 137 P.3d at 751 (Holm argues his exception is based on Utah Code
section 30-1-9).
259. State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004); see also Richard A. Vazquez,
The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public
Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLy 225, 239-40 (2001) (suggesting that the prevention of
abuse of women and children justifies polygamy bans).
260. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 775 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
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if the state's interest really is to prevent crimes against women
and children, 261 the law could be more narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. 262 General bans on polygamy involving consenting
adults 263 are not a particularly effective way to prevent marriages
involving children. 264
A statute permitting polygamy might nonetheless impose
restrictions based on age or consanguinity. Assault is not
somehow immunized from prosecution because the victim is a
marital partner. While there is general agreement that the state
interests in preventing these harms are legitimate and perhaps
compelling, there is far less agreement about whether the means
chosen to effectuate these ends are sufficiently tailored to survive
close scrutiny, since those interests could be served even were
polygamy permitted. 265
The Holm court further noted the difficulties associated with
prosecuting polygamous practices, given the closed nature of the
communities where this is practiced. 266 Yet, it is difficult to see
how the criminalization of polygamy would make the communities
where polygamy is practiced less closed-it seems more reasonable
in part) ("Further, the State itself has indicated that it does not prosecute those
engaged in religiously motivated polygamy under the criminal bigamy statute
unless the person has entered a religious union with a girl under eighteen years
old.").
261. Cf. Joseph Bozzuti, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After
Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. LAW. 409, 436
(2004) ("Polygamous wives are often teenagers. In some communities, male
polygamists 'consistently marry [girls] between the ages of fourteen and sixteen.'
Often, the age disparity between husband and wife is upward of twenty years or
greater." (quoting Strassberg, supra note 46, at 366)).
262. See Holm, 137 P.3d at 775 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[Al blanket criminal prohibition on religious polygamous unions is not
necessary to further the state's interests, and suggest that a more narrowly tailored
law would be just as effective.").
263. Cf. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1069 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The
plaintiff has made an undisputed showing that his two wives consented to the
plural marriage ... ").
264. Commentators do not appreciate that this disconnect suggests that the
statute could in fact be more narrowly tailored. See Vazquez, supra'note 259, at
247 ("There is no alternative to Utah's criminal bigamy statute that is less
restrictive on the free exercise of religion while still managing to combat the crimes
committed in polygamous communities.").
265. Cf. D. Marisa Black, Beyond Child Bride Polygamy: Polyamory, Unique
Familial Constructions, and the Law, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 497, 505 (2006) ("The
Utah Attorney General's Office has said that the prosecution of polygamy falls on
local law enforcement, but that as a practical matter bigamists will not be
prosecuted in the absence of the more serious crimes of child abuse, domestic
violence, and fraud.").
266. State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004) ("[T]he closed nature of
polygamous communities makes obtaining evidence of and prosecuting these
crimes challenging.").
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to believe that they are closed, at least in part, because of the very
laws prohibiting the conduct. Indeed, it may be that permitting
adult polygamy would make communities less closed 267 and so less
likely to shelter (other) illegal activity. 268
At least one issue lurking in the background in these cases is
whether the implicit picture of polygamous relationships is in fact
accurate. 269 Some commentators suggest that stereotypical
depictions of polygamous relationships were offered in the past,270
and that this practice of misrepresentation continues today.271
Even if some of the criticisms of polygamy as practiced in the later
1800s were accurate, i.e., that it imposed a system of patriarchy, 272
those same criticisms might not be accurate of present-day
polygamy. 273
267. Slark, supra note 208, at 459.
268. See Rower, supra note 224, at 727. But see Strassberg, supra note 46, at
411 ("It is these threats that may well provide the ultimate justification for the
continued criminalization of polygamy.").
269. Cf. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 749 (Utah 2006).
Holm contends that the trial court erred bv not allowing him to put into
evidence expert testimony addressing the social historv and health of
polygamous communities. Specifically. Holm argues that such testimony
was necessary to rebut the notion that polygamous communities are rife
with abuse and victimize children.
Id.
270. See Irwin Altman, Husbands and Wives in Contemporary Polygamy, 8 J.L.
& FAM. STUD. 389, 392 (2006) ("[A] pattern of stereotyping [of polygamy that] was
evident in nineteenth century writings and legal opinions."); cf. Sealing, supra note
44, at 703 (discussing the "flood' of anti-polygamy tomes [whose] . . . themes
included plural wives as slaves, the lust of old men for young girls, and incest in
polygamous families").
271. Altman, supra note 270, at 392 ("Some of these and other stereotypes and
caricatures are still used today, with polygamous men labeled as selfish,
controlling, and exploitive of women.... As with many stereotypes, such qualities
are applied to whole populations, are often exaggerations, and are based on a
limited numbero of cases.").
272. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 508 U.S. 520,
569 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("Reynolds, which in upholding the polygamy conviction of a Mormon stressed the
evils it saw as associated with polygamy .. " (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166 (1878))); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 ("Professor Lieber says, polygamy
leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities,
fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in
connection with monogamy."). But see Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1038 ('The
Mormon women's rights advocates at the time argued, with good reason, that
plural wives were in fact more liberated than their New England counterparts.").
273. Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1040 ('The quick dismissal of polygamy on
grounds that it, unlike monogamy, is distinctively gender-inegalitarian is the result
of smuggling in a set of unstated assumptions .. . that are implausible assumptions
about plural marriage in a liberal egalitarian democracy."); cf. Strassberg, supra
note 46, at 391 ("[Plolygyny ultimately improved the situation of a considerable
number of women who had experienced extreme social, economic and/or emotional
deprivation in the Mormon mainstream.").
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Professor Eskridge notes that "allowing a man to take two
wives might create or exacerbate hierarchical structures within
the marriage,"274 arguing that, because "the husband would have
to deal with at least twice as many wives, it is probable that he
would establish a more authoritarian structure for the
marriage. ' 275  Yet, such an argument proves too much. If
marriages can be precluded because of a fear that hierarchical
relationships would otherwise be promoted, then it would seem
that a whole host of marriages involving only two individuals
might also be prohibited. 276 For example, such a rationale would
justify precluding those who believe women should be subservient
to their husbands from marrying. 277
The point here should not be misunderstood. Various United
States Supreme Court Justices have been critical of polygamous
practices. In Davis v. Beason,27s the Court wrote:
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized
and Christian countries. They are crimes by the laws of the
United States, and they are crimes by the laws of Idaho. They
tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb
the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man.
Few crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society,
and receive more general or more deserved punishment. 279
The Cleveland Court stated that the "establishment or
maintenance of polygamous households is a notorious example of
promiscuity."28 0 In McGowan v. Maryland, Justice Douglas made
clear that he considered polygamy an "extreme" situation
appropriately subject to prohibition, although he did not expressly
state which harms he associated with polygamy. 281
At least one issue in polygamy cases should be whether the
state must provide evidence that the practice at issue, especially if
confined to consenting adults, would cause the harms sometimes
274. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 149 (1996).
275. Id.
276. See Calhoun, supra note 17, at 1040-41 (noting that such an argument
suggests that we should be "willing to also eliminate monogamous civil marriage
because it, too, sometimes takes social forms that are oppressive to women").
277. Cf. Chambers, supra note 15, at 82 ("We need to remember that large
numbers of conservative Christians, Muslims, and Jews in monogamous marriages
in the United States today accept a view of wives as subordinate to their
husbands.").
278. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
279. Id. at 341.
280. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946).
281. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 574 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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alleged. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his Smith dissent,
the free exercise jurisprudence has "not allowed a government to
rely on mere speculation about potential harms, but ha[s]
demanded evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a religious
exception."28 2 It has never been clear that permitting an exception
for polygamy for consenting adults as a matter of free exercise
would have the horrible implications sometimes alleged. While
some, but not all, polygamous relationships 28 3 might involve abuse
or exploitation, 284 the same can be said of monogamous
relationships. 285
Some commentators suggest that recognizing polygamous
relationships may in fact fill a need, i.e., where there is a dearth of
available males. 28 6 For example, Professor Wing suggests that
polygamy might provide an additional option for racial and ethnic
minority women.28 7 To some extent, past Mormon polygamous
actions might have also provided alternative options for older
unmarried women or for women who were widowed. 288
B. Non-Mormon Plural Relationships
In the public mind, polygamy is generally associated with
fundamental Mormonism. 28 9 A related, non-Mormon practice,
282. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
283. See, e.g., Potter, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1129 (C.D. Utah 1984) ("Plaintiff's wives
and children receive adequate care, love and attention and want for no necessity of
life.").
284. Cf. Chambers, supra note 15, at 66 (noting that "some women in
polygamous marriages suffered badly"); Harmer-Dionne, supra note 45, at 1330
("[O]ther women endured dreadful situations, ridden with strife and jealousy, from
which their children bore sensitive scars.").
285. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 335 (2004) ("But
coercion and oppression, of course, afflict bilateral relationships as well as
multiparty ones."); cf. Harmer-Dionne, supra note 45 at 1329-30 ('The reality of
polygamy very much reflected the reality of monogamy, [s]ometimes it worked, and
sometimes it didn't.").
286. Cf. Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black
Britannia to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the
Twenty-First Century, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 858 (2001) ("African
Americans today face conditions in which de facto polygamy can flourish. A
disproportionate number of our men are unavailable for marriage-due to early
death, imprisonment, high unemployment, and intermarriage.").
287. Id. at 863; cf. Harmer-Dionne, supra note 45, at 1329 (discussing the
argument offered by Mormons in the 19th century, that where "there is a surplus of
women and their status depends very much on being a wife and mother," they
should be provided with such status").
288. Harmer-Dionne, supra note 45, at 1329-30 ("Often the women who married
into polygamy were immigrants, widows, or spinsters.").
289. See Larcano, supra note 6, at 1068 (discussing "polygamy as most
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polyamory, is receiving growing attention. Professor Strassberg
explains: "Contemporary practitioners have coined the names
'polyamory' and 'polyfidelity' to describe a wide range of partner
arrangements that vary as to the number of people involved, the
sexes of those involved, the sexualities of those involved, the level
of commitment of those involved, and the kinds of relationships
pursued." 290
Polyamory is similar to polygamy in that more than two
parties are involved in the relationship, but it is different both
because it might involve multiple male partners and/or same-sex
or bisexual relationships. 291
Polyamory involves multiple consensual relationships, 292
although those relationships need not all be marriages.293
Polyamorists may seek recognition of their relationships for a
multitude of reasons, such as to secure insurance coverage, 294 or to
merely avoid losing child custody because of having a polyamorous
relationship. 295
Polyamorists may view themselves as "practicing
nonmonogamy as part of an ethical practice that shares some of its
aspirations with more mainstream models of intimate
relationships." 296 These intimate relationships may, but need not,
be sexual. 297 Further, all of these relationships may involve
obligations to all of the involved parties.298 For example, some
relationships might require the consent of all parties involved
before an individual may bring more parties into the
Americans traditionally understand it-a practice tied to fundamental
Mormonism"); Rower, supra note 224, at 712 ("In the United States, polygamy is
almost exclusively associated with the Mormon Church.").
290. Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering
Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (2003).
291. Id. at 440-41; Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 124 (2001).
292. Black, supra note 265, at 500 ("Polyamory ... proponents emphasize the
consensual nature of such a relationship choice.").
293. Id. ("Polyamory ... is not necessarily based on multiple marriages.").
294. Id. at 505 ("Some polyamorists are legally married for health benefits,
citizenship, or other reasons, and therefore may be living in violation of the bigamy
and adultery prohibitions.").
295. See id. at 503 ("A pervasive fear among polyamorists is that their children
will be taken from their home or that parental custody will be curbed due to a
parent's polyamorous lifestyle.").
296. Emens, supra note 285, at 283.
297. See id. at 305. But see id. ("[Slome writers posit that the term polyamory
must incorporate sexual nonexclusivity.").
298. See Strassberg, supra note 290, at 446 ("Groups of any size, from two on up,





Polyamorous relationships are also prohibited if more than
two of the parties wished to marry. Further, under a bigamy
statute like Utah's that has a cohabitation prong, polyamorists
could be subject to prosecution even if only two members of the
relationship contracted to marry. 3u0
The existence of polyamorous relationships further
complicates the analysis of polygamy statutes. A legislature,
which passed statutes prohibiting plural marriage in an attempt
to address the alleged harms implicated in polyamorous
relationships, would not thereby be targeting religious practices.
Such a statute would not run as high a risk of invalidation under
free exercise guarantees as would a similar statute targeting
religiously-inspired plural marriages. 301
Another complicating factor in the analysis of polygamy
legislation is that Mormons have not been the only group to
practice plural marriage. Historically, some Native American
tribes recognized polygamous unions as well. That another group
engaged in the practice has several implications.
Congress did not choose to void plural marriages involving
Native Americans. 302 This at least suggests that Congress was
distinguishing among groups practicing polygamy and targeting
Mormon practices in particular. Thus, the federal statutes
targeting polygamy are even more appropriately subject to a
Hialeah analysis because the statutes at issue in Hialeah
differentiated among religious groups. 303
An analogous point might be made about various state laws.
Some states had to decide whether they would recognize Native
American plural marriages, and courts sometimes recognized
them out of comity. 304 For example, in Ortley v. Ross,305 the
299. Emens, supra note 285, at 308 ("A term such as 'polyfidelity' clarifies the
type of commitment among the parties, and is defined as [a] lovestyle in which
three or more primary partners agree to be sexual only within their family.
Additional partners can be added to the marriage with everyone's consent."
(citations and internal quotations omitted)).
300. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (2003).
301. See supra Part II.B.
302. Hallowell v. Commons, 210 F. 793, 800 (8th Cir. 1914) ("Congress could
have passed a law prohibiting plural marriages among tribal Indians if it saw fit,
but it did not do so.").
303. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
536 (1993) (noting that one of the exceptions appeared to "cover kosher slaughter").
304. See, e.g., Hallowell, 210 F. at 800; Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W.
602, 605 (Mich. 1889); Morgan v. McGhee, 24 Tenn. 13, 14 (1844).
305. 110 N.W. 982 (Neb. 1907).
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Nebraska Supreme Court recognized a Native American plural
marriage that had been celebrated in accord with Native American
"customs and usages."30 6 The Nebraska Legislature subsequently
enacted legislation that (1) precluded Native Americans marrying
solely according to custom,30 7 (2) required those Native Americans
marrying to do so civilly, 308 and (3) made Native American plural
marriage illegal, whether celebrated civilly or according to
custom. 30 9
The Nebraska response is unique. While almost all states
criminalize bigamy or polygamy, 3 10 no other state has a separate
law specifying how Native American plural marriages will be
treated. Most of the statutes criminalize plural marriage within
their bigamy statutes, 311 although some expressly criminalize
306. Id. at 983.
307. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-403 (2004).
308. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-404 (2004).
309. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-406 (2004). Section 42-402 addresses the
legitimacy of children.
Whenever any man and woman, either of whom is whole or in part of
Indian blood, shall have cohabited together as husband and wife according
to the customs and manners of Indian life, the issue of such cohabitation
shall be taken and deemed to be the legitimate issue of such persons so
living together, notwithstanding the fact that the father and mother may
have been divorced or separated according to Indian customs, or otherwise,
and married to other persons, according to Indian custom, or otherwise.
Id.
310. Slark, supra note 208, at 453 ("[Bligamy and polygamy are expressly
prohibited in all jurisdictions except Hawaii, where the second marriage is simply
annulled."). But cf. Tagupa v. Tagupa, 121 P.3d 924, 926 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) ("In
Hawai'i, living person A's purported marriage to living person C, while living
person A is lawfully married to living person B, is void ab initio.").
311. ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.140(a) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3606(A)
(2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-201(a) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 281(a) (West
1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1001 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-501 (LexisNexis
2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 826.01 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1101 (2004);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-2 (LexisNexis 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.1 (West
2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 551(1) (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §
10-502(b) (LexisNexis 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-13 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN.
45-5-611(1) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-701(1) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.160
(2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:1 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1(a) (West
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-1 (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (McKinney
2000); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 12.1-20-13 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 881 (West
2003); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.515(1) (West 2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4301(a) (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-10 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. § 22-
22A-1 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-301(a) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.64.010(1) (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-401(a) (2004). Many of the
statutes cited here include a specification of defenses to the charge, for example,
that the previous marriage had been dissolved or declared void or that the spouse
had been absent for a period of years and was not known to be living. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1002 (listing defenses including a belief "after diligent
inquiry" that first spouse was dead); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 882 (listing
"[e]xceptions to the rule of bigamy"). But cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 17-A, § 551
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polygamy.312 In addition, some states, such as Utah, include
cohabitation within their polygamy statutes. 313
As a general matter, a state may refuse to recognize a plural
marriage, even if validly celebrated elsewhere.3 14 A separate issue
is whether an exception must be made on free exercise grounds.
Even were an exception made on free exercise grounds for plural
marriages involving adults, the state would presumably have a
sufficiently compelling interest in refusing to recognize plural
marriages involving minors, 315  even if validly celebrated
elsewhere. 316
C. Same-Sex Marriages
Some commentators suggest a key difference between
polygamous and same-sex unions is that the former but not the
latter implicate free exercise guarantees. 317 Yet, this is incorrect
both because some plural marriages do not implicate free exercise
concerns and, more importantly, because some same-sex unions
(failing to enumerate specific defenses).
312. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 15 (LexisNexis 1992); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. §
750.439 (West 2004).
313. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-1(a) (LexisNexis 1975 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-6-201(1) (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20(a) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-1
(2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.01 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (2003). Some states include cohabitation in a different way,
making it a crime to cohabit with someone after having celebrated a plural
marriage with that person elsewhere. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-190(a)
(West 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12(a) (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN § 21-
3601(a) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.010(1) (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:76 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 609.355(2) (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.010.1
(West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-183 (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2919.01(A) (LexisNexis 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 13, § 206 (1998); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-362 (2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.05(1) (West 2005).
314. People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (Sup. Ct. 1992) ("[A] polygamous
marriage legally consummated in a foreign country will be held invalid in New
York." (citation omitted)); Bronislawa v. Tadeusz, 393 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (Fam. Ct.
1977).
315. Indeed, Utah makes this a separate offense:
An actor 18 years of age or older is guilty of child bigamy when, knowing
he or she has a wife or husband, or knowing that a person under 18 years
of age has a wife or husband, the actor carries out the following with the
person who is under 18 years of age: (a) purports to marry the person who
is under 18 years of age; or (b) cohabits with the person who is under 18
years of age.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101.5(1) (2003).
316. See, e.g., Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 116-17 (invalidating a marriage between
a Nigerian adult and his thirteen-year-old wife).
317. See, e.g., Elijah L. Milne, Blaine Amendments and Polygamy Laws: The
Constitutionality of Anti-Polygamy Laws Targeting Religion, 28 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 257, 285-86 (2006) (arguing that, unlike same-sex marriages, polygamous
marriages implicate free exercise concerns).
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do. A variety of religious traditions recognize same-sex unions, 318
and a person wishing to marry a same-sex partner as part of his or
her religious tradition has an equally valid argument that the
state's refusal to allow such a marriage triggers free exercise
guarantees.
Commentators note the central role marriage plays within a
variety of religious traditions, 319 and there is no reason to believe
that same-sex unions do not play an important role in the spiritual
lives of individuals seeking to marry a same-sex partner. 320 Even
were there reason to believe that religious traditions recognizing
same-sex unions did not consider such unions to be of central
importance, that would not alter the force of the point here. As the
Smith Court stated:
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the
"centrality" of religious beliefs before applying a "compelling
interest" test in the free exercise field, than it would be for
them to determine the "importance" of ideas before applying
the "compelling interest" test in the free speech field. What
principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a
believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to his
personal faith?32 1
Indeed, to trigger free exercise protections, there is no requirement
either that the prohibited practice be central to a person's faith or
that the practice be accepted by the general populace. As the
Thomas Court explained: "[R]eligious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection."322 Indeed, those practices
need not even be accepted by all members of the religion to trigger
the relevant protections. The Thomas Court noted that "it is not
within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire
318. See Jamal Greene, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE L.J.
1989, 1995 (2005) (noting that many religions recognize same-sex marriage);
Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion
of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 1, 24 (2005) (noting that some
religions celebrate same-sex unions).
319. Richard L. Elbert, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the
Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1171, 1203 (1995) ("Today,
marriage remains a fundamental tenet of the major religions practiced in the
United States."); Steven L. Nock, Why Not Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 273,
290 (2001) (discussing "the centrality of marriage in western religion").
320. See Greene, supra note 318, at 1995 (suggesting that marriage has
"substantial spiritual significance for same-sex couples" regardless of whether it is
sanctioned by their religion).
321. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87
(1990) (citation omitted).




whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly
perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation."' 323
Commentators comparing same-sex and polygamous unions
tend not to focus on the point that the state refusal to recognize
either might implicate free exercise protections. Instead, they
have sought to highlight some of the differences between the two
as a way to establish that polygamous unions may not be
constitutionally protected even if same-sex unions are. 324
Yet, some of the differences mentioned, even if accurate, are
not the kind of differences upon which to base a decision about
which marriages are or should be protected. For example, some
commentators suggest that the desire to enter into a same-sex
union is more deeply rooted than the desire to enter into
polygamous relationships and for this reason same-sex but not
polygamous relationships should be recognized.325 But we
generally do not impose the requirement that only those with a
deeply rooted desire to marry may do so. Nor is it clear how we
would go about testing the relative strengths of individuals'
desires to marry.
Likewise, there is some disagreement about the relative
strengths of individuals' desires to have deep, possibly sexual,
relationships with more than one individual. 26  Some
commentators claim that this is a near-universal desire that is
systematically undervalued. 327 Even if such desire did not exist,
there is still the separate issue of measuring the desire to marry
more than one person when doing so would fulfill a religious
obligation. 328
Other commentators have made the related argument that
same-sex marriage goes to essential aspects of identity and
personhood, whereas polygamous marriage involves a mere choice
323. Id. at 716.
324. See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 290; see also Larcano, supra note 6, at 1086
(listing her article's goals without mentioning free-exercise issues); Donovan, supra
note 45, at 589 ("To the extent that opponents of same-sex marriage bear the
burden to demonstrate that same-sex marriage will result in polygamy, they have
failed.").
325. See Chambers supra note 15, at 79 (discussing commentators making this
argument).
326. Id.
327. Emens, supra note 285, at 342-43 ("ITlhe desire to be sexually involved
with more than one person, or with someone other than an existing partner, is
viewed as nearly universal.").
328. See Chambers, supra note 15, at 79 (arguing that gay people's need to
marry is no more compelling than the needs of others to engage in polygamy).
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to marry more than one individual.3 29 Yet, this is exactly the sort
of argument which is open to abuse-some same-sex marriage
opponents argue that sexual orientation is not an essential aspect
of personhood 330 and that this is a reason to deny same-sex couples
the right to marry. Given that same-sex marriage serves many of
the same societal and individual interests 331 as opposite-sex
marriages, 332 it is not at all clear that such marriages would
appropriately be prohibited even if sexual orientation is not an
329. James M. Donovan paraphrases one such argument put forth by political
commentator Andrew Sullivan:
[Tlo be homosexual is iust that: to be something. But to be polvgamous is
merely to do something. Homosexuality is state of being, while polygamy
is an activitv. This ontological difference reouires that the two be treated
differentlv legally. At the very least, a principled ground thereby exists for
such differential treatment.
Donovan, supra note 45, at 541. Larcano adopts this argument in her 2006 law
review article:
[Tihe most inherent (and most hotly contested) difference (and the most
hotly contested assertion) between same-sex marriage and polvgamv is
that polvgamv represents a choice, while sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic, such as race or gender. While this statement
has been challenged, studies show there is a hormonal and genetic basis
for sexual orientation making sexual orientation biologically fated. This
does not apply to polygamists. Plural wives can enter "into monogamous
marriages in the absence of a polygamous alternative," while most gay and
lesbian individuals "would not enter into heterosexual marriages in the
absence of a same-sex alternative." Because sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic, gay and lesbian couples should have the same
rights to marrv as heterosexuals-anything less wholly denies them the
right to marry. Polygamists. under the current structure, are not denied
the right to marry someone, just the right to marry anyone and everyone.
Larcano, supra note 6, at 1080-81 (footnotes omitted). As Elizabeth F. Emens
notes: "Unlike homosexuals, who are understood by many to possess a distinct and
unalterable identity, polyamorists are rarely seen as having a distinct identity."
Emens, supra note 285, at 342.
330. See Jason Montgomery, An Examination of Same-Sex Marriage and the
Ramifications of Lawrence v. Texas, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 687, 700 (2005)
("Another argument against same-sex marriage is that the state has a legitimate
interest in discouraging homosexuality. This argument assumes homosexuality is
harmful and is a lifestyle choice rather than a biological predetermination.");
Edward Clark, The Construction of Homosexuality in New Zealand Judicial
Writing, 37 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 199, 207 (2006) (discussing a New
Zealand child custody case that treated sexual orientation "as a rather trivial
choice").
331. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The plurality opinion discussed
some of the important individual interests implicated in marriage, including
"expressions of emotional support and public commitment," id. at 95, and "the
receipt of government benefits," id. at 96. The Court expressly noted that "the
commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an
expression of personal dedication." Id.
332. See Strasser, supra note 18, at 603-04 (2002) (arguing that same-sex
marriage promotes the same kinds of societal and individual interests as do
opposite-sex marriages, i.e., providing a setting in which children and adults might
flourish).
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important part of individual identity.
Some commentators suggest that same-sex marriage should
be differentiated from polygamous marriage because only the
former is based on romantic love. 333 Yet, this criterion is also
subject to abuse. Some same-sex marriage opponents suggest that
same-sex marriage should not be permitted precisely because they
would not be contracted for love. 334
Suppose that individuals wishing to enter into a plural
marriage claimed to be in love. Would some test be used to
establish the truthfulness of the claim? Would that same test be
used for two-person unions (regardless of whether they involved
same-sex or opposite-sex couples) to determine whether they could
marry? The difficulties inherent in defining and testing love
counsel against employing such a criterion. Many two-party
marriages might be prohibited because the individuals could not
establish that they had the requisite amount of the "correct" kind
of feelings.
Same-sex unions and polygamous unions can be
differentiated in constitutionally significant ways. The relevant
statutes are facially distinguishable in an important respect for
equal protection purposes, namely, that one distinguishes on the
basis of sex while the other does not. Further, the claimed
interests served by the statutes, such as the prevention of child
marriages, differ. Yet, the differences between them should not
obscure an important similarity, namely, that polygamy and same-
sex marriage bans may well implicate free exercise guarantees.
Conclusion
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a
Colorado constitutional amendment precluding the state and local
governments from banning discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 335  The Court held, six to three, that such an
amendment, which imposed a unique disability on a disfavored
class, did not pass muster even under rational basis review. 336 In
333. E.g., Donovan, supra note 45, at 563 ("[Traditional marriage, grounded in
romantic love, in which gays and lesbians seek to share, is antithetical to the
practice of polygamy.").
334. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 14, at 424 ("[M]any gay marriages would be
marriages of convenience entered into primarily for the tangible benefits." (footnote
omitted)).
335. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996).
336. Id. at 631-32 ("[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a
rational relation to some legitimate end. Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even
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his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority failed to
explain how a law prohibiting polygamy "was not an
'impermissible targeting' of polygamists," while the milder
amendment 2 was an "impermissible targeting of homosexuals."' 337
He wondered whether the Court concluded that the perceived
social harm of polygamy is a '"legitimate concern of government,'
and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not."338 Justice
Scalia's comments are instructive on a number of counts.
First, after Lawrence v. Texas,339 perhaps the perceived social
harm of same-sex relations cannot be used to justify a unique
disability on members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender community.340 Second, Justice Scalia carefully
characterized the relevant statutes to target polygamy rather than
Mormons in particular, 34 1 presumably because targeting Mormons
is impermissible under contemporary jurisprudence, even if the
Reynolds Court had no compunctions about such targeting.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer serves as notice that he
would interpret a holding that same-sex marriage is
constitutionally protected to require similar protection for
polygamous unions.342 While such a claim is false, because the
allegedly compelling state interests served by the respective bans
this conventional inquiry." (citations omitted)).
337. Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. Id. (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 535 (1993)).
339. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
340. See id. at 577-78 ("Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear.
First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married
persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not
intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to
intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons." (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
341. Some commentators fail to appreciate that Justice Scalia's characterization
makes the discrimination appear non-religious, and hence not subject to
invalidation on its face. See Sealing, supra note 44, at 700 ("Justice Scalia
succeeded in removing the anti-polygamy provisions he cited from the generally
applicable law of his heavily criticized Smith holding, and by showing that the
provisions were aimed against a particular group, placing them in the Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye category.")
342. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 648 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The Court's disposition
today suggests that these provisions are unconstitutional, and that polygamy must
be permitted in these States on a state-legislated, or perhaps even local-option,
basis-unless, of course, polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional
rights than homosexuals.").
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are quite different, 343 it may well be that both should be
constitutionally protected-Scalia's presumed view to the contrary
notwithstanding.
There is good reason to believe that some laws targeting
polygamy were adopted as a way of targeting Mormons. Suppose,
however, that some laws are adopted to combat the alleged evils of
plural marriage as a general matter, not to target Mormons in
particular or religious practices more generally. Even still, an
exception should be made for religiously-inspired plural marriages
involving adults. Indeed, many of the claimed harms of polygamy
might be combated as well or better were a more carefully crafted
prohibition created.
The differences between plural and same-sex marriages must
not obscure an important similarity between them. Either
marriage might be sought, at least in part, for its spiritual
significance. Given that marriage is a fundamental interest, a
challenge either to a polygamy or a same-sex marriage ban by a
sincere individual with the relevant religious beliefs should trigger
the strict scrutiny promised under Smith's hybrid analysis.
Would such a challenge be successful? That is unclear, 344 but
the state would at least have to show which compelling interests
were served by the ban and why that prohibition was sufficiently
tailored to achieve those interests. Were the Court to take its
avowed obligations seriously, as explained in either Hialeah or
Gonzales, and actually consider whether the statute before it
served compelling state interests-which could not also be served
with a free exercise exception-it is hard to imagine how it would
uphold the current statutes. Time will tell whether the Court will
be willing to take its own free exercise jurisprudence seriously or
instead will invent a new rule affording even less protection to the
rights of religious minorities.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 340-41.
344. See Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious
Liberty and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital
Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV. 625, 664 (2003) ("[M]any have argued that while Smith
substantially narrowed the theoretical scope of free exercise protection for religious
conduct, it did not really change the outcome for most cases."); Jaasma, supra note
45, at 291 ("Even the application of a compelling interest test would in no way
provide a guarantee, or even a likelihood, that a free exercise challenge to laws
against polygamy would succeed, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's long history
of rejected free exercise claims.").
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